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INTRODUCTION 
In 1960, Ronald H. Coase famously addressed the problem of ex-
ternalities—actions of business firms that have harmful effects on oth-
ers—or, as he renamed it, “the problem of social cost.”1 This Article 
seeks to address this problem through a comparative analysis of the al-
ternative institutional solutions of ownership, market, taxation, responsi-
bility, and the accounting system of the joint entity.2 
Each prospective solution carries a distinct strategy. The ownership 
solution involves the allocation, by law, of control rights that individuals 
can bargain for. The market solution, in contrast, involves the allocation 
of that right through a competitive auction. Taxation requires the estab-
lishment of a public order concerned with the power to fix and raise tax-
es, whereas the responsibility solution involves the enforcement of a 
compensation claim or liability for tort damages. Finally, the entity solu-
tion consists of a joint system of governance that is characterized by an 
accounting system of the joint activity under scrutiny. 
Coase claims that the delimitation of property rights is, in and of it-
self, sufficient to achieve social welfare. But Coase bases this claim on 
an efficiency criterion that looks solely to the sum of individual welfares, 
without regard to the possibility of inequitable results. His approach con-
founds notions of social cost, incurred loss, and lost opportunity gain, 
and faces distinctive accounting problems with individual availability 
and capacity to pay, along with the incommensurability of values. This 
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Article takes a different approach. It introduces a “systemic efficiency” 
criterion based on welfare ranges for individuals in addition to the total 
sum. Using this criterion, this Article argues that, by requiring explicit 
income-sharing and joint-decision instrumentalities, the entity solution is 
the most efficient and equitable solution to the social cost problem. 
Part I of this Article discusses the divide between market and prop-
erty rights, a divide that is often overlooked due to a traditional focus on 
the divide between market and state solutions. Part II discusses the prob-
lem of institutional design generally and the alternative solutions of own-
ership, market, taxation, and responsibility in particular. To compare 
these alternative solutions to the problem of social cost, Part III refines 
the overarching notion of efficiency from a systemic viewpoint. Part IV 
then introduces the entity solution, based on the coupling of governance 
and accounting systems of the socioeconomic activity under scrutiny. 
Part V deals specifically with the problems inherent in Coase’s account-
ing perspective, while Part VI discusses these problems in the context of 
the firm. Part VII provides concluding remarks. 
I. THE QUARREL BETWEEN MARKET AND OWNERSHIP 
The development of an empirically grounded theoretical perspec-
tive is arduous. And the theoretical perspective of economics is still in 
the process of being developed. Compare, for example, theoretical eco-
nomics with theoretical physics and its use in parachute design. Para-
chute design is concerned with the theoretical issue of the law of gravity. 
All objects are expected to fall according to a universal relationship be-
tween space and time, which is subsumed by the same constant accelera-
tion or “standard gravity” measure. This means that both a parachute and 
a feather fall in the same way. But when further specifications are consi-
dered, applied physics eventually allows physicists to design viable para-
chutes that fall decently and usually do not crash. Economic theorists, in 
relative comparison, are still raising questions about Newton’s apple:3 
Why does it descend perpendicular to the ground? Why does it not go 
sideways or upwards? This can be problematic for designing parachutes, 
gathering apples, or, in our case, understanding the theoretical economics 
of property rights. 
Yet, concerning the law and economics of property rights, over-
arching concepts and ideas should not be left unaddressed, as David 
Kennedy reminds us.4 Neglecting them eventually leads us to praise or 
                                                 
 3. WILLIAM STUKELEY, MEMOIRS OF SIR ISAAC NEWTON’S LIFE 20 (A. Hastings White ed., 
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 4. David Kennedy, Some Caution about Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic Develop-
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reject regulatory regimes without addressing the fundamental issues of 
their legal-economic design. At least two theoretical positions on the law 
and economics of property rights currently face off. On one side, Coase 
claims that the delimitation of property rights is, in and of itself, suffi-
cient to achieve social welfare whenever “the pricing system works 
smoothly ([where] the operation of a pricing system is without cost).”5 
When this happens, “[t]here is clearly room for a mutually satisfactory 
bargain . . . .”6 
[W]ithout the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights 
there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them. 
But the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is 
independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to 
work without cost.7 
As Oliver E. Williamson explains: 
Upon reformulating the externality problem in contractual terms 
and pushing the logic of zero transaction cost reasoning to comple-
tion, [Coase] realized an astonishing result: “Pigou’s conclusion 
(and that of most economists of that era) that some kind of govern-
ment action (usually the imposition of taxes) was required to re-
strain those whose actions had harmful effects on others (often 
termed negative externalities)” was incorrect. That is because if 
transaction costs are zero then the parties to tort transactions will 
costlessly bargain to an efficient result whichever way property 
rights are assigned at the outset.8 
In fact, Coase explains that in a world in which costs of rearranging the 
rights initially established by the legal system exist, “the courts . . . are, 
in effect, making a decision on the economic problem and determining 
how resources are to be employed.”9 This implies that property rights 
play an important role in generating the best economic solution under a 
given economic system. Even in the absence of competitors, who act as 
alternative outside options for each transacting party, the parties can 
transact bilaterally and reconfigure the initial delimitation of rights in the 
most efficient way. In the process, property rights modify the allocation 
of resources through the accomplishment of a bilateral exchange transac-
tion. This further implies that the initial allocation of property rights is no 
                                                 
 5. Coase, supra note 1, at 2. 
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. Id. at 8. 
 8. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression, 100 AM. 
ECON. REV. 673, 675–76 (2010) (internal citations omitted). 
 9. Coase, supra note 1, at 27. 
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longer independent from the final result. Therefore, ownership shapes 
resource allocation even beyond and behind competition. 
Quarreling with Coase, Kenneth J. Arrow questions whether prop-
erty rights alone achieve social welfare under conditions of bounded 
rationality. Arrow points to the importance of competition in such 
achievement, the market equilibrium being less a bilateral bargain than a 
multilateral game: 
[U]nder these [limited] knowledge conditions, the superiority of the 
market over centralized planning disappears. Each individual agent 
is in effect using as much information as would be required for a 
central planner. This argument shows the severe limitations in the 
argument that property rights suffice for social rationality even in 
the absence of a competitive system.10 
While they may not agree on the role of property rights in achieving so-
cial welfare, both Coase and Arrow recognize the role of institutional 
arrangements in achieving efficient and fair allocation of resources. From 
this perspective, whenever the price system does not work smoothly, not 
only property rights, but all norms and rules that constitute the institu-
tional framework can shape the performance of every socioeconomic 
activity. They constitute an “institutional structure of production” whose 
design and enforcement matter for economic efficiency and equity. 
II. ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE  
PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST 
The problem with externalities concerns the formation of a social 
order that binds individuals together. In particular, it points to interac-
tions between individuals that can affect their individual welfares. This 
interaction occurs under distinctive institutional designs; Coase fosters a 
legal-economic analysis of these designs that involve economic (mone-
tary), legal, and political dimensions. Individual interests are then ex-
pected to be adjusted (and divergences settled) by the rule of law. The 
following chart summarizes the available institutional designs and how 
they are effectuated. 
                                                 
 10. Kenneth J. Arrow, Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System, 59 J. BUS. S385, 
S392 (1986). 
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Alternative  
Institutional  
Designs 
Monetary  
Regime  
(what counts?) 
Legal  
Regime  
(what regulates?) 
Political  
Regime  
(what decides?) 
Property Rights Monetary  
payments 
Ownership  Transferable 
control right 
Market Monetary bids Competitive  
auction 
Allowable  
control right 
State Intervention Tax payments Public order Public right to 
impose and 
raise taxes 
Responsibility Compensation  
payments 
Liability or tort 
law 
Enforceable 
claim for  
liability or tort 
Entity Accounting  
system 
Joint agreement Joint  
governance 
Traditional economic analysis treats ownership, market competi-
tion, and state intervention as alternative regulatory solutions to the prob-
lem of social cost. Under this analysis, society is imagined to arise from 
the freedom of individuals transacting in the open market. When the 
market fails to establish a suitable order, the state intervenes and substi-
tutes for it. Competition is then replaced by authority and spontaneous 
order with planning. The above-mentioned quarrel between Coase and 
Arrow introduces a question grounded in the inherent distinction be-
tween market and ownership: Whether the allocation of property rights, 
even in the absence of competition, is sufficient to establish a suitable 
order? This in turn raises a broader question: In choosing between alter-
native institutional solutions to the social cost problem, how should an 
ideal ordering between ownership, market competition, and state inter-
vention be measured? The classic divide between efficiency and equity 
leads to two customary answers. On one hand, we have the so-called 
Pareto efficiency, which requires that one individual fares better while all 
the others fare at least as well as when they started; on the other, we have 
the principle introduced by Coase, advocating for the maximization of 
the social value of production. As we shall see, Coase’s social value 
principle, in focusing entirely on efficiency at the expense of equity, is a 
less-than-ideal mechanism for choosing between alternative institutional 
solutions. 
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A. A Numerical Heuristic 
In an effort to analyze the possible alternative institutional solutions 
to the social cost problem, let us reformulate Coase’s social value prin-
ciple using a numerical heuristic adapted from Svetozar Pejovich’s 
work.11 In our heuristic, two parties, A and B, are confronted with a no-
velty (some generic activity or production) that has a reciprocal impact 
on their respective economic welfares. The performance of the novelty 
depends on a control (or decision) right to be assigned to one or the other 
parties. Assume for simplicity’s sake that A has an initial endowment of 
1,200 and B of 1,000. Following Coase, the social value is merely de-
fined as the sum of both welfares, that is, an initial total value of 2,200. 
Two scenarios are contemplated; both concern a generic activity by 
someone (B) with negative externalities on someone else (A), who does 
not benefit directly from that activity. 
In the first scenario, the performed novelty would generate a net 
loss of 200 for A and a net gain of 500 for B. The total social value is 
thus increased by 300. 
First Scenario A B Total Value 
Before 1,200 1,000 2,200 
Novelty -200 500 300 
In the second scenario, the performed novelty would generate a net 
loss of 500 for A and a net gain of 200 for B. The total social value is 
thus decreased by 300. 
Second Scenario A B Total Value 
Before 1,200 1,000 2,200 
Novelty -500 200 -300 
B. The Ownership (Property Rights) Solution 
Absent transaction costs, Coase suggests that the social cost prob-
lem is efficiently solved whatever the initial assignment of the transfera-
ble control right because, ultimately, the total social value in both scena-
rios will be at least maintained. 
In the first scenario, for example, if the control right is allocated to 
B, A would want to buy the right to keep B from doing the activity and 
creating the externalities. But A cannot offer enough because his oppor-
tunity gain of 200 (his avoided loss) is less than B’s opportunity gain of 
                                                 
 11. SVETOZAR PEJOVICH, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND SYSTEMS (1995). 
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500. Alternatively, if the control right is allocated to A, B is able to buy 
the right from A because his opportunity gain of 500 is more than A’s 
avoided loss of 200. Thus, in both cases the production is accomplished 
and the social value is increased.  
First Scenario: Property Rights Solution A B Total Value 
Right to B 1,000 1,500 2,500 
Right to A 1,200 1,300 2,500 
But the ex post allocation of welfare—defined through cumulated 
incomes or wealth dynamics—is not equivalent for both parties. If the 
right is allocated to A, he will maintain his welfare while B appropriates 
the whole increase in social value. Alternatively, if the right is allocated 
to B, he will have an even larger welfare increase at the expense of A, 
whose individual welfare decreases. In this way, the solution does not 
appear to comply with Pareto efficiency, requiring that all parties be at 
least as well-off as when they started, with at least one party being strict-
ly better.12 
In the second scenario, if the control right is allocated to B, A will 
buy it from B because his opportunity loss of 500 is more than B’s op-
portunity gain of 200. Alternatively, if the control right is allocated to A, 
B would not be able to pay for acquiring the right from A because his 
opportunity gain of 200 is less than A’s avoided loss of 500. In both situ-
ations then, the activity or production is not accomplished, any social 
loss is avoided, and the original social value is maintained. 
Second Scenario: Property Rights Solution A B Total Value 
Right to B 1,000 1,200 2,200 
Right to A 1,200 1,000 2,200 
Yet once again, the ex post allocation of welfare (incomes or 
wealth) is no longer equivalent for both parties. If the right is allocated to 
A, both A and B will maintain their welfare and the total social value 
does not change, even though B would lose his opportunity gain. If the 
right is allocated to B, he will increase his welfare at the expense of A, 
who is not as well-off as when he started. Again, this solution does not 
seem to comply with Pareto efficiency. 
Furthermore, the ownership solution involves potential transactions 
requiring reciprocal payments. This means that the opportunity gains are 
                                                 
 12. This might fit the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency that implies a cardinal notion of 
utility. 
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monetary in nature and that the losing party needs to access available 
funding (including costly bank credit) to perform the payment. Thus, the 
financial endowment of the losing party will ultimately determine 
whether losses in total social value can be prevented. 
The transaction could be even more problematic if we consider cer-
tain epistemic and strategic conditions. For example, what happens if one 
party seeks to appropriate the other party’s gain? In the first scenario, A 
could try to bargain for the control right to acquire more than his oppor-
tunity loss as compensation. And in the second scenario, B could try to 
extort a higher compensation than his opportunity gain of 200, since A 
could be expected to pay up to his anticipated loss of 500. In both scena-
rios, a bargaining solution is thus possible between 200 and 500, absent 
an outside option that helps one party negotiate his power struggle with 
the other. In the first scenario, the ownership solution exposes A to a new 
welfare level between 1,000 and 1,700 (1,200 being the initial level), 
while B’s range is between 1,000 and 1,500 (1,000 being the initial lev-
el). In the second scenario, the ownership solution exposes A to a re-
duced welfare level between 700 and 1,200 (1,200 being the initial lev-
el), while B’s range is between 1,000 and 1,500 (1,000 being the initial 
level). These transaction and bargaining problems create uncertainties 
that could undermine the effectiveness of the ownership solution. 
C. The Market Solution 
To respond to the bargaining problems raised by the ownership so-
lution, institutional designers have suggested having the bargaining 
“price” fixed by the market or the state. Following Arrow, a public au-
thority (Authority) could institute an auction procedure whereby both 
parties would bid for the control right according to their respective op-
portunity gains and avoided losses, using all the information at their dis-
posal. The Authority would then share the welfare change according to 
the competitive structure of the auction. In the first scenario, the novelty 
would be implemented and the Authority would acquire a share of the 
increased total value (2,500) between 200 and 500. In the second scena-
rio, the novelty would not be implemented and the Authority would 
again acquire a share of the total social value between 200 and 500, even 
though the total social value has not changed. In both scenarios, the out-
come still has distributive effects and reshapes individual welfares. For 
example, in the first scenario, A experiences a reduced welfare level to 
1,000, while B shares a welfare gain of up to 500, to be shared with the 
Authority. In the second scenario, A experiences a welfare loss between 
200 and 500 with that welfare being transferred to the Authority, while B 
remains as well-off as when he started. Thus, while the market solution 
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may address the bargaining problem inherent in the ownership solution, 
like the ownership solution it does not appear to comply with Pareto 
efficiency since at least one outcome results in A being in a worse posi-
tion than when he started. 
D. The Taxation Solution 
The taxation solution suggested by Arthur Cecil Pigou13 entails the 
intervention of a public authority (Authority) capable of discovering and 
taxing the activity as a share of its added total social value. B can then 
decide whether to perform the novelty or not by integrating the tax 
amount into his calculation. In the first scenario, a lump-sum tax of up to 
500 will result in B performing the novelty, with the benefits being 
shared between B and the Authority. In the second scenario, this result 
will be achieved by a lump-sum tax up to 200. We should note, however, 
that the taxation solution does not necessarily produce efficiency in total 
social value, since the lump-sum tax does not always prevent the novelty 
from being performed in the second scenario where a loss in social value 
is expected. To prevent the novelty from being performed in the second 
scenario, the lump-sum tax would have to be more than 200. Moreover, 
the individual welfares are also reshaped. In the first scenario, for exam-
ple, A experiences a net loss, bringing his welfare level down to 1,000, 
while B may have a welfare gain of up to 500 to be shared with the Au-
thority according to the institutional structure of the tax. In the second 
scenario, if the tax discourages B from performing the activity, the wel-
fare of both is maintained. Otherwise, A experiences a loss of 500 down 
to a welfare level of 700, while B and the Authority share a welfare gain 
of 200. 
In his criticism of Pigouvian taxation, Coase discusses two possible 
tax bases—either on the damage done or on the fall in total value result-
ing from the novelty being performed.14 In our heuristic, both scenarios 
fix the tax on the basis of A’s loss.15 This implies that the novelty will be 
performed in the first scenario, where A incurs a loss of 200 while the 
added income (500) is shared between B (300) and the Authority (200). 
In the second scenario, the tax level of 500 prevents the novelty from 
being performed, and both A and B maintain their previous welfares 
(with B merely losing an opportunity gain). 
                                                 
 13. ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932); ARTHUR CECIL 
PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912). 
 14. Coase, supra note 1, at 41–42. 
 15. The argument for computing social cost after reorganization is incorrect because the reor-
ganization itself is a consequence of the novelty, and the related choice and cost should be included 
in the social cost calculation. 
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In situations involving payments to the Authority then, the question 
remains whether the Authority would use its revenues to compensate A. 
In some situations, this compensation could restore Pareto efficiency and 
make A at least as well-off as when he started. Thus, the taxation solu-
tion could protect against the loss of social value and comply with Pareto 
efficiency, but only if established and used to compensate the losing 
party. 
E. The Responsibility Solution 
To respond to the problems associated with the ownership, market, 
and taxation solutions, institutional designers could allow B to perform 
the novelty under a responsibility or tort rule, whereby B would be re-
quired to compensate A’s injuries. Under the responsibility solution, B 
must be able to calculate the compensation due to A in order to decide 
whether to perform the novelty and pay A damages (200) in the first 
scenario or not perform the novelty because the encountered payment for 
damages (500) exceeds the expected private benefit (200) in the second 
scenario. In both scenarios, the responsibility solution creates the same 
results as would allocation of the control right to A, provided A can show 
legal proof of the liability amount to some enforcing third party. 
III. THE QUEST FOR EFFICIENCY 
As stated above, Coase claims that, in the absence of transaction 
costs, the delimitation of property rights is, in and of itself, sufficient to 
achieve social welfare.16 He bases this claim on an efficiency criterion 
that measures efficiency solely as a function of the total social value 
achieved. But as we have seen, while allocation under the property rights 
solution may result in optimizing total social value, it also results in redi-
stributing individual welfare. In particular, allocation of the control rights 
to B results in either an unfair privilege in the first scenario or extortion 
by law in the second. In both scenarios, A experiences a net loss at the 
individual level and is forced to pay a ransom to B to avoid an even 
greater loss in the second scenario. 
Following the work of Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, 
this implies that when considering the socioeconomic efficiency of alter-
native institutional designs, the allocative (efficiency) and distributive 
(equity) dimensions of such designs cannot be separated.17 Furthermore, 
Coase’s efficiency criterion leads him to argue against state regulation 
                                                 
 16. Coase, supra note 1, at 2. 
 17. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2. 
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and in favor of the ownership solution mediated by exchangeable proper-
ty rights, preferring private over public powers: 
It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have 
tended to over-estimate the advantages which come from govern-
mental regulation. But this belief, even if justified, does not do more 
than suggest that government regulation should be curtailed. It does 
not tell us where the boundary line should be drawn. This, it seems 
to me, has to come from a detailed investigation of the actual results 
of handling the problem in different ways. But it would be unfortu-
nate if this investigation were undertaken with the aid of a faulty 
economic analysis. The aim of this article is to indicate what the 
economic approach to the problem should be.18 
It seems to me preferable to use the opportunity cost concept 
and to approach these problems by comparing the value of the 
product yielded by factors in alternative uses or by alternative ar-
rangements. The main advantage of a pricing system is that it leads 
to the employment of factors in places where the value of the prod-
uct yielded is greatest and does so at less cost than alternative sys-
tems (I leave aside that a pricing system also eases the problem of 
the redistribution of income). But if through some God-given natu-
ral harmony factors flowed to the places where the value of the 
product yielded was greatest without any use of the pricing system 
and consequently there was no compensation, I would find it a 
source of surprise rather than a cause for dismay.19 
But in fact, as our heuristic demonstrates, all of the institutional so-
lutions discussed above are efficient according to Coase’s criterion. How 
then are we to choose among the alternative designs? We can begin by 
adopting a systemic notion of efficiency that compares the welfare 
ranges for individuals and the collectivity (defined as their sum) to 
measure the economic fairness of each institutional design. In contrast to 
Coase’s criterion, this notion of fairness considers efficiency and equity 
from an economic viewpoint. From this perspective, only the responsibil-
ity solution is always Pareto efficient; that is, it is the only design that is 
expected to always maintain initial individual welfares. Since the only 
consistently Pareto efficient system seems to be the one that seeks to 
protect A, we can conclude that an institutionally imposed level playing 
field and protection for the weakest party when externalities are involved 
are desirable attributes of an institutional system. 
                                                 
 18. Coase, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 19. Id. at 40. 
1036 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1025 
Comparative results of economic fairness as measured by individual and  
collective welfare ranges20 
 A 
(min) 
A 
(MAX) 
B 
(min) 
B 
(MAX) 
PA 
(min) 
PA 
(MAX) 
Total 
Value 
(min) 
Total 
Value 
(MAX) 
Ownership -500 +500 0 +500 0 0 0 +300 
Market -500 -200 0 +500 +200 +500 0 +300 
Taxation -500 0 0 +500 0 +500 0 +300 
Responsibility 0 0 0 +300 0 0 0 +300 
In addition, according to this economic fairness analysis, the market 
solution (through an auction) appears to be the least efficient and least 
equitable form of regulation since, in the absence of some sort of com-
pensation mechanism, the weakest party always loses and the strongest 
party always wins (absent outside constraining options). Accordingly, the 
market does not appear to be the appropriate solution when parties are 
locked into a situation with reciprocal externalities. And if the market 
solution is implemented, regulators should intervene to compensate the 
losing party. 
The taxation and ownership solutions, respectively based on public 
and private power, are also inconsistently efficient and equitable. Both 
may involve severe reductions in individual welfares and can produce the 
largest potential welfare asymmetry. Nevertheless, both taxation and 
ownership can be effective if their microstructure fits the situation. Spe-
cifically, under the ownership solution, the control right must be allo-
cated to the weakest party, while under the taxation solution, taxes 
should be based on the social value added or lost by the activity under 
scrutiny and be used to compensate the losing party. 
Whichever institutional solution is chosen, both discovery and dis-
closure of information about payoffs are critical. While the ownership 
solution, based on bilateral bargaining, and the market solution, based on 
auction, add to this criticality concerning each party’s capacity to pay,21 
an environment of enforceable disclosure of information and measure-
ment—that is, an accounting system—is required for every institutional 
solution. A traditional focus on solutions driven by ownership, market, 
and the state22 has prevented legal-economic scholars from considering 
                                                 
 20. In this figure, PA stands for Public Administration. The PA column calculates the benefits 
shared by the Public Administration and the performing party under the auction (Market) and tax 
(Taxation) alternatives. 
 21. Capacity to pay implies the party’s capacity to raise credit, employ available funds, or sell 
entitlements to future (expected) gains. 
 22. See OSTROM, supra note 2. 
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an alternative systemic solution—that of the joint entity—that will be 
outlined below. This solution reshapes the same basic elements of infor-
mation, measurement, and decision in an alternative institutional frame-
work based on the introduction of a social accounting framework. 
IV. THE ENTITY VIEW OF THE CATHEDRAL 
As Coase recognized, the problem of social cost has a reciprocal 
nature in that it implies interdependency between welfares of involved 
parties. One party’s welfare critically depends on the welfare and deci-
sion-making process of the other. Thus, a collective dimension exists that 
must be considered. Specifically, a collective social income is at stake, 
either positive or negative, depending on the institutional design. 
With this understanding, and drawing upon the work of Adolf A. 
Berle,23 another institutional solution can be established through the crea-
tion of a joint entity—for instance a partnership or joint venture agree-
ment—involving both parties as stakeholders. The control right is then 
allocated to the joint entity rather than to only one of the parties. Both 
parties commit their previous welfares as personal entries to the entity, 
and an accounting system of the entity can then be designed to represent 
the joint welfare. A balance sheet statement will report on personal en-
tries and their changes, while a social income statement will report on the 
joint income added and lost by the joint activity. 
Returning to our heuristic, in the first scenario, the novelty is ac-
complished according to its expected positive income. Both parties carry 
the impact of the activity in their personal final balances, while they 
share the joint result together. At least 200 units should be allocated to A 
in order to obtain Pareto efficiency, as accounted for by the personal 
account of A. Of course, A would refuse to agree to the performance of 
the novelty if such a condition were not accepted. 
First Scenario:  
Entity Solution 
Initial  
Balance 
Final  
Balance 
Social Income 
Statement 
Personal Account of A 1,200 1,000 -200 
Personal Account of B 1,000 1,500 500 
Total 2,200 2,500 300 
                                                 
 23. Adolf A. Berle Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW 186–200 (Yuri Biondi et al. eds., 
2007) [hereinafter THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY]. 
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In the second scenario, the novelty will not be accomplished be-
cause of its expected negative income. Both parties will remain as well-
off as they started, before the novelty was contemplated. 
Second Scenario:  
Entity Solution 
Initial  
Balance 
Final  
Balance 
Social Income 
Statement 
Personal Account of A 1,200 700 -500 
Personal Account of B 1,000 1,200 +200 
Total 2,200 1,900 -300 
Under the entity solution, neither property rights nor competitive 
markets are involved; rather a system of joint decision-making (or go-
vernance) concerning activity under scrutiny is established. A simple 
personal veto rule—replacing the exit option in bilateral bargaining—
will allow the parties to obtain efficient and equitable results in both 
scenarios. 
Fairness as measured by individual and collective welfare ranges 
 A 
(min) 
A 
(MAX) 
B 
(min) 
B 
(MAX) 
PA 
(min) 
PA 
(MAX) 
Total 
Value 
(min) 
Total 
Value 
(MAX) 
Social  
Accounting 
System 
0 300 0 300 0 0 0 300 
In the absence of transaction and information costs, the entity solu-
tion thus appears to be the most satisfying regulatory solution since it 
allows for the maximization of total value according to Coase’s criterion; 
for the maintenance, at a minimum, of individual welfares according to 
Pareto efficiency; and for the possibility of increasing all individual wel-
fares through the sharing of social income. Both efficiency and equity are 
enhanced, and a kind of systemic efficiency is realized. It is this systemic 
efficiency that is lacking in the alternative solutions. In particular, the 
allocation of property rights facilitates a system of private powers but 
does not exclude the abuse of them. And taxation raises problems con-
cerning allocation of tax revenues, revenues that are not equivalent to 
compensation. Instead, an accounting system involves the liberty of 
choosing the allocation of social income.24 And, importantly, an account-
                                                 
 24. The entity solution appears to be suitable even from a dynamic perspective. While the 
dynamic game of interacting power and counter-power established by ownership, market, and state 
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ing approach, as envisioned by the joint entity solution, recognizes the 
importance of choice as a distinct dimension of value irreducible to mon-
etary payments, something Coase’s approach overlooks. This oversight 
by Coase, and its attendant problems, will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
V. THE ACCOUNTING PROBLEM IN COASE’S APPROACH 
Coase focuses on the (change of) value added and lost by our hypo-
thetical novelty. In doing so, he uses an efficiency criterion based solely 
on the total value added, without regard to the disparate impact the no-
velty may have on individual welfares: “The economic problem in all 
cases of harmful effects is how to maximize the value of production.”25 
But value is a complex notion, consisting of two distinctive dimensions: 
a monetary dimension based on payoffs and reciprocal payments, and a 
choice dimension related to the decision to perform the novelty under 
scrutiny. In particular, Coase argues for switchable boots by establishing 
an alleged symmetry between costs of incurred loss and lost opportunity 
gain.26 
Whether the $3 is a payment which the cattle-raiser [B in our heu-
ristic] has to make if he adds the third steer to his 
herd . . . [generated by the novelty under scrutiny] or whether it is a 
sum of money which he would have received if he did not keep a 
third steer . . . [paid by A] does not affect the final result. In both 
cases $3 is part of the cost of adding a third steer, to be included 
along with the other costs. 
. . . [A] receipt foregone of a given amount is the equivalent of 
a payment of the same amount.27 
It is one of the beauties of a smoothly operating pricing system 
that, as has already been explained, the fall in the value of produc-
tion due to the harmful effect would be a cost for both parties.28 
If the factory owner is to be made to pay a tax equal to the 
damage caused, it would clearly be desirable to institute a double 
tax system and to make residents of the district pay an amount equal 
                                                                                                             
intervention may be expensive and hazardous, the entity solution enables an ex-ante comprehensive 
framework of analysis and decision-making. 
 25. Coase, supra note 1, at 15. 
 26. Id. at 9. 
 27. Id. at 7. 
 28. Id. at 13. 
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to the additional cost incurred by the factory owner (or the consum-
ers of his products) in order to avoid the damage.29 
But when current facts (and realities), and an accounting for those facts, 
are considered, what we see is that the “boots” are asymmetrical. In fact, 
Coase’s approach mistakenly mingles three different notions: cost, in-
curred loss, and opportunity gain lost. This misunderstanding leads to 
distinctive accounting problems with availability to pay, capacity to pay, 
and incommensurability of values. As we shall see, availability to pay by 
one party does not imply improvement of its welfare; the need of some 
capacity to pay by one party makes enforcement dependent on the wealth 
at its disposal; and incommensurability of values reduces choice to its 
monetary equivalent, making money almighty. 
First, availability to pay by one party does not necessarily translate 
as welfare improvement for that party. In both of our scenarios, A incurs 
an actual loss of welfare from the performance of the novelty. A may 
have the capacity to pay B to avoid that loss, but avoiding the loss does 
not amount to a gain for A, as he experiences no increase in overall wel-
fare. Conversely, B expects a potential gain from the performance of the 
novelty. But this does not mean that B loses anything if the novelty is not 
performed, since his existing welfare is not reduced by the loss of his 
opportunity gain. A distinction between expectations and facts (reality) 
has to be established for the accounting system to work effectively in 
reporting the relationship between A and B. This distinction emphasizes 
the difference between future time—represented by individual guesses, 
intentions, and hopes and fears—and past time—represented by an ac-
counting history that, in principle, may be partly public, consistent, and 
conventionally agreed upon.30 From an accounting perspective, the avail-
ability to pay to avoid an even greater loss is different from giving up 
some expected gain. The potential gain is merely an expected income 
that has to be compared to the total expected cost (including losses) gen-
erated by the parties’ joint decision. 
More generally, by coupling efficiency with measurement, Coase’s 
approach converts individual values to monetary payments (prices) and, 
in the process, further reduces the choice dimension to a monetary mea-
surement. This reduction causes the accounting problems concerning 
individual capacity to pay and incommensurability of values. As Pareto 
argued: 
                                                 
 29. Id. at 41. 
 30. G.L.S. SHACKLE, THE YEARS OF HIGH THEORY: INVENTION AND TRADITION IN ECONOMIC 
THOUGHT 1926–1939, at 257–58 (1967). 
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In a volume on economics recently published we find that “the price 
is a concrete manifestation of value.” We are already familiar with 
the incarnations of Buddha. To them we are now asked to add the 
incarnations of Value.31 
The problem with such an incarnation, especially when externalities are 
involved, is that (as stated above) the availability to pay does not neces-
sarily correspond to an increase of a party’s initial welfare. It is true that 
no regulatory system can avoid establishing some agreed upon or con-
ventional criterion of monetary translation. For example, the taxation 
solution makes this criterion publicly established since the tax base is 
expected to translate the social loss resulting from the externality. The 
ownership and market solutions delegate this measurement to bilateral 
bargaining and the auction procedure respectively. The responsibility 
solution entrusts the legal process to establish the incurred damage 
through tort law and further allows for punitive damages as incentive 
regulation (with revenues being appropriated by the public authority). 
That said, some systems can avoid imposing the capacity to pay as a 
(plutocratic) condition precedent to the protection of individual welfares, 
as in the case of the responsibility and entity solutions, neither of which 
require A to have the capacity to pay to avoid his loss in welfare. 
It is important to note that under an accounting approach, cost does 
not imply that pricing is a measure of value.32 Accounting numbers are 
instrumentalities to facilitate choice, but they do not purport, by them-
selves, to replace choice with monetary equivalences. The distinction 
between choices, values, and prices implies, then, an additional criticism 
of Coase’s notion of efficiency. It reduces the underlying choice to a 
monetary incarnation of values. Coase clearly stated that “[t]he aim of 
such regulation should not be to eliminate smoke pollution but rather to 
secure the optimum amount of smoke pollution, this being the amount 
which will maximize the value of production.”33 His perspective ulti-
mately entails the management of negative externalities, not social pre-
vention and accommodation. This raises the problem of incommensura-
bility of values, values that are critical in the case of externalities. Certain 
individual and collective values—such as environmental sustainability or 
                                                 
 31. VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY 30 n.1, § 62 (Andrew Bongiorno & Arthur 
Livingston trans., Arthur Livingston ed., 1935) (1906). 
 32. See Yuri Biondi, Money without Value, Accounting without Measure: How Economic 
Theory Can Better Fit the Economic and Monetary System We Live in, in MONEY AND 
CALCULATION: ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Massimo Amato, Luigi Doria & 
Luca Fantacci eds., 2010) (stating that the confusion between price and value appears to survive 
from the classical economic English tradition, which dominated the nineteenth century and the birth 
of the political economy). 
 33. Coase, supra note 1, at 42. 
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the qualities of human life—are hardly measurable and theoretically can-
not be translated into monetary amounts.34 In particular, these values 
may still raise critical concerns even when all stakeholders agree with the 
regulatory solution and the social income is increased monetarily. 
Coase’s criterion may therefore imply paradoxical strategies and results 
over time and across contexts. In contrast, the prevention of negative 
externalities is a fundamental policy goal for public and private policy-
makers aiming to achieve sustainability and welfare. And, ultimately, 
this prevention is a matter of choice, not a monetary translation. 
VI. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS: ACCOUNTING AND THE  
THEORY OF THE FIRM 
In the last part of his article, Coase takes both the cost of market 
transactions and the cost of information into account.35 This recognition 
introduces a dynamic dimension into his legal-economic analysis, mak-
ing the final social outcome dependent on backward incentives and cost-
ly enforcement of institutional rules. These costs alter the playing field of 
the social game both at the individual and collective level. In particular, 
individual and social incomes are now dependent on the inter-individual 
behaviors under alternative institutional designs. In this context, Coase 
fostered a comprehensive approach based on realistic premises and com-
parative institutional analysis: “Satisfactory views on policy can only 
come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms, and 
governments handle the problem of harmful effects.”36 But he implicitly 
considers all organizational forms to be based on ownership. Both the 
firm and the government are considered as super-owners, that is, authori-
tarian solutions (hierarchies) that substitute bargaining with administra-
tive decisions.37 Concerning the formation of the social order and the rule 
of law, Coase’s ownership perspective mediates Locke, who attributes 
social order (i.e., the resolution of conflicts and the balance of powers) to 
the connection between individual freedom and ownership, and Hobbes, 
                                                 
 34. In 1729, Jonathon Swift satirically criticized the reductionist view in his A Modest Propos-
al, arguing against emergent “political Arithmetic” that precedes “political Economy” and “econom-
ics.” In this essay, Swift mocked the British officials and all gentlemen of fortune by appearing to 
suggest that the poor Irish might solve their economic problems by selling their children as food. 
JONATHAN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL (1729), available at www.readaclassic.com. This satire 
develops a full-length argument suggesting possible recipes for the children and the economical 
calculations for doing this with the goal to “find out a fair, cheap, and easy method of making these 
children sound and useful members of the common-wealth.” Id. at 13. By the way, does it not asto-
nish that we use the same word for financial and human “values” as if they would be of the same 
order? 
 35. Coase, supra note 1, at 15–19. 
 36. Id. at 18. 
 37. Id. at 16–17. 
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who bases the establishment of that order upon the intervention of a be-
nevolent Leviathan. 
Drawing on Berle and his institutional perspective, the entity solu-
tion approaches the formation of the social order by building on constitu-
tional principles, which should drive institutional design and enforce-
ment. Under an economic republic, these principles are called upon to 
enable and protect individual liberty and inter-individual solidarity in a 
field of immanent conflict and overwhelming power. The entity here is 
not a Leviathan or a super-owner, but an intermediate collective body 
that is an object of the law, not a legal subject or person. The entity’s 
institutional framework governs it and the individuals involved, with a 
view toward achieving a better social order, both on a systemic and indi-
vidual level. This leads to a system of reciprocal rights and obligations, 
rather than a system of private or public powers. According to Berle, this 
approach 
resolves the conflict between the property notion that an owner can 
do what he likes with his own and the governmental concept that a 
public agency is obliged to serve all alike within strict constitutional 
limitations, evenhandedly, up to the limit of its capacity. Instead of 
nationalizing [or privatizing] the enterprise, this doctrine “constitu-
tionalizes” the operation.38 
The entity corresponds, then, to the social (inter-individual) activity 
that has to be regulated through an institutional mode of organization and 
coordination. Every mode raises specific problems and controlling costs 
that must be considered and comparatively assessed in specific situa-
tions. The notion of “transaction costs” should, therefore, be generalized 
to that of “regulatory costs,” that is, the functioning costs for each specif-
ic institutional regime.39 Specifically, the regulatory costs of the owner-
ship and responsibility solutions are legal costs, whereas accounting and 
auditing costs are the regulatory costs of the entity solution. The regula-
tory costs of the market solution are trading gains and losses, whereas 
capital gains and losses from arbitrage can be considered the social cost 
of using the market to fix prices and perform market-based transactions 
as, according to Coase, the cost of writing and enforcing contracts is the 
social cost for bilateral transactions. To some extent, then, every institu-
tional solution implies a specific mode of accounting, just as every ac-
counting system needs an institutional structure. In choosing an institu-
                                                 
 38. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity: Protection of Per-
sonal Rights from Invasion through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 943 (1952). 
 39. These costs relate to both private and public regimes that are interconnected. Governing 
costs, regulatory costs, and controlling costs are then conceptually analogous. 
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tional design, however, we should not focus solely on minimizing regula-
tory costs, as such costs are merely one dimension of that choice, while 
problems of institutions must ultimately dissolve into a study of history 
and philosophy. Instead, choosing an institutional design necessarily 
entails making distinctive decisions that are logically ordered and based 
on purpose and cost.40 
Our legal-economic analysis of externalities and social cost has 
fundamental implications for the theory of the firm. In the case of the 
firm, both individual and collective outcomes result from the situated 
dynamic between the institutional structure and inter-individual beha-
viors whose payoffs depend on the social income to the firm, and vice-
versa. François Perroux defined the firm as a socioeconomic entity lo-
cated in some specific economic time and space that systematically gene-
rates and exploits externalities.41 From this perspective, the entity solu-
tion relates to the place and role of the firm as a specific mode of coordi-
nation. The very existence of the firm (and its essence) depends on the 
working of its accounting system. The nature of the firm, therefore, re-
lates to the nature of the accounting system, rather than to ownership or 
the market (the pricing system). 
The importance of accounting systems in the legal-economic defini-
tion of the firm has been recognized by leading scholars, including Berle 
and Fisher,42 and Coase.43 The proper functioning of a firm’s accounting 
system is made critical because of the changing number and kinds of 
transactions, and because of operations and events that are involved in 
the firm’s activity over time. This may explain the emergence of standar-
dized forms of business and nonbusiness accounting. These forms con-
tribute to the coordination and regulation of complex and dynamic organ-
izations. From an epistemic viewpoint, they reduce the complexity and 
stabilize the dynamics of those organizations over hazard, ignorance, and 
interaction. They are indeed fundamental modes of economic coordina-
tion that frame and shape the creation and allocation of resources. For 
example, financial accounting rules on dividend distribution and share-
                                                 
 40. Decision-making, not decision-makers, is hierarchically ordered, as was emphasized by C. 
Menger’s lexicographic criterion or Pareto’s ordinal utility criterion of choice. While accounting 
numbers deal with the horizontal dimension of institutional design, constitutional principles are the 
republican order’s response to its vertical dimension and accounting principles provide such a re-
sponse for accounting regulation. See Yuri Biondi, The Pure Logic of Accounting: A Critique of the 
Fair Value Revolution, ACCT. ECON. & L., Article 7 (2011), available at http://www.bepress.com/ 
ael/vol1/iss/1/7. 
 41. FRANÇOIS PERROUX, L’ECONOMIE DU XX° SIECLE (3d ed. 1969). 
 42. Adolf A. Berle Jr. & Frederick S. Fisher, Jr., Elements of the Law of Business Accounting, 
32 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1932). 
 43. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 23, at 82–91; Ronald H. Coase, Accounting and the 
Theory of the Firm, 12 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (1990). 
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holders’ equity maintenance, fiscal accounting systems, prudential re-
serves calculation and requirement systems, and accounting standards are 
important features of accounting systems. 
The accounting system overcomes “ownership” within the firm. 
From the ownership perspective, which still influences current theories 
of the firm, the asset side comprises wealth accumulated on behalf of the 
owner who provides equity and has to pay for the firm’s debts.44 The 
focus is on the residual rent that accrues to his equity after all pay-
ments,45 and the separation between ownership, management, and control 
is undermined. But according to Schmalenbach: 
The economic function of business-making is not to be or become 
wealthy [reich]; and whoever goes on counting [zählen] his worth 
[Vormögen] makes unproductive work [unproducktive Arbeit]. 
Nonetheless, income [Erfolg] should be accounted for and kept 
being accounted [messen]. For the economic function of business-
making is to produce, transport, store and sell goods [Güter] until 
the last man, and to do all this economically so that the means 
[Stoff] of such endeavor do not wear out in the process.46 
In fact, the accounting system of the business firm operates in order to 
make the activity of the firm accountable to various stakeholders, includ-
ing shareholders, and introduces an inter-individual (and inter-temporal) 
dimension. According to A. Charles Littleton, firms are expected to de-
liver a specific enterprise service that leads to the following accounting 
principle: “Business enterprises are accepted and used because they per-
form effective economic functions in supplying goods (for living) and 
employment (for earning).”47 Personification of either the owner or the 
firm does not help us understand this institutional dimension of account-
ing.48 Assets are better understood as immobilizations required by the 
firm activity, while both liabilities and equities have financed those in-
vestments and wait for remuneration and recovery over time. The focus 
is on income comprising all revenues and expenses that together generate 
all the remunerations provided to stakeholders having commitments and 
                                                 
 44. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 23; see also Yuri Biondi, The Governance and Disclo-
sure of the Firm as an Enterprise Entity, 5 COMP. RES. L. & POL. ECON. 3 (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440871. 
 45. Fair value accounting introduces a peculiar accounting purpose, focusing on the change in 
net worth between two arbitrary moments of time. The theoretical distinction between historical cost 
(flow method) and fair value (stock method) accounting correspond to that between entity and 
proprietary accounting perspectives that characterizes American accounting thought. 
 46. EUGEN SCHMALENBACH, DYNAMISCHE BILANZ 1–60, 65–101 (4th ed. 1926). Cf. also 
English edition (1959), at 30–31; last German edition (1962), at 49. 
 47. A. CHARLES LITTLETON, STRUCTURE OF ACCOUNTING THEORY 24 (1953). 
 48. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 23; Biondi, supra note 44, at 3. 
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expectations regarding the economic performance and position of the 
firm. On this basis, the accounting system represents the firm as an ob-
ject of collective enterprise over time, not as an individual (or joint) 
property. As a matter of law, no one owns the firm; shareholders own 
nothing but their shares.49 
Both corporate accounting and government systems50 address “oth-
er people’s interests,” including other people’s money and the public 
interest. In this inter-individual context, accounting systems should be, 
and have been historically, designed to facilitate the smooth functioning 
of accountability relationships among interested parties, in order to assist 
fiduciary bodies that govern the collective activity on behalf of those 
parties for settling divergent interests and protecting the continuity of 
their joint activity over time. Accordingly, the accounting system can 
include the cost of shareholders’ equity, and distinguish it from the en-
terprise entity equity that is available for enterprise financing and distri-
butions to other constituencies.51 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has dealt with the problem of social cost raised by 
Coase.52 The Article has compared ownership, market, taxation, respon-
sibility (or tort law), and the accounting system of the joint entity as al-
ternative modes of economic organization under the specific conditions 
of efficiency, information, and control that belong to each institutional 
design. By requiring explicit agreement on income-sharing and joint-
decision instrumentalities, the entity solution provides the most satisfy-
ing results in absence of transaction and information costs, so long as the 
accounting system works smoothly. 
Notwithstanding his insightful advances on institutional compara-
tive analysis of alternative forms of economic organization, Coase53 has 
misunderstood the accounting system of social income by confounding 
social cost, incurred loss, and lost opportunity gain. His approach raises 
distinctive accounting problems with individual availability and capacity 
to pay, and the incommensurability of values. In contrast, the entity view 
has been developed here to suggest a comprehensive definition of effi-
                                                 
 49. See, e.g., THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 23; Jean-Philippe Robé, The Legal Structure 
of the Firm, ACCT. ECON. & L. (2011), available at http://www.bepress.com/ael/vol1/iss1/5. 
 50. The “government” concept replaces the “governance” concept that refers to the mythical 
sovereignty of the proprietary entrepreneur. See Biondi, supra note 44. 
 51. Biondi, supra note 40. Yuri Biondi, Governing the Business Enterprise: Ownership, Insti-
tutions, Society, 5 COMP. RES. IN L. & POL. ECON. 3 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1440889. 
 52. Coase, supra note 1. 
 53. Id. 
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ciency that takes both individual and collective welfares into account. 
This approach provides further advances to understand the place of ac-
counting systems in business and nonbusiness organizations. 
